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Abstract: 
In Anglo-American law, fiduciary duty is the core legal concept to address conflicts of interest of 
directors/managers and shareholders. The concept is developed and constantly refined by courts 
in the process of adjudication. By contrast, most civil law jurisdictions, including many transition 
economies, either lack the procedural rules that would enable parties to bring such cases to courts, 
or have not developed a sufficient body of case law to determine the contents and meaning of this 
concept. This paper asks, whether courts should be the primary lawmakers and law enforcers 
concerning the duty of loyalty. Based on our theory of the incompleteness of law, this paper 
argues that given a highly incomplete law, allocating lawmaking and law enforcement to courts is 
optimal when the expected harm does not have strong externalities. Breaching fiduciary duty is 
such an area, as “only” shareholders of that company, not the investing public at large will be 
harmed. While courts in transition economies may have difficulties living up to the task, we 
propose that for this particular area of the law, there are no better lawmaking and law 
enforcement mechanisms available. The case law they will produce is most likely to diverge from 
case law developed elsewhere, but this result is inevitable given incompleteness of law. 
                                                 
1 We are indebted to Dimitri Gavriline, Moscow (Russia), and Professor Stanislaw Soltysinski, Warsaw 
(Poland) for locating relevant case laws; and to Dr. Tanja Buseva and Sinisa Petrovic of Croatia for trying 
to identify similar case laws in their countries. 
Introduction  
 
Fiduciary duty is a core concept in Anglo-American corporate law for delineating the 
rights and responsibilities of directors and managers, as well as dominant shareholders 
vis-à-vis shareholders. Yet its precise meaning is difficult to discern without references to 
a large body of case law. Judge-made law has over time carved out a subset of specific 
obligations and standards of conduct associated with the principle. Most widely accepted 
are the duty of care and the duty of loyalty, where the duty of loyalty refers to situations 
in which conflict of interest is present. More recently, it has been proposed to add the 
duty of disclosure and the duty of special care when a company is a takeover target 
(Black 2001). The meaning of each of these obligations is explained by referring to a 
subset of more specific obligations derived by courts in the process of adjudication, with 
the important qualification that the enumeration of obligations is not exhaustive. Others 
can be added over time as business practices change and pose new challenges to the law.  
The broad and encompassing nature of the concept appears to be a crucial factor in 
explaining the importance the concept has acquired in Anglo-American jurisdictions 
(Clark 1986; Coffee 1989; Eisenberg 2000; Johnson et al. 2000). It has allowed courts to 
take account of the changing nature of the business enterprise while maintaining at least 
the semblance of undisputed principles for determining what is right and what is wrong in 
corporate conduct. As many have pointed out, the corporate law of the U.S. in particular 
has developed from a (fairly) prohibitive, or mandatory, corporate law into an enabling 
one, which allows shareholders to opt out of many legal provisions and substitute them 
with their own contractually determined arrangements (Coffee 1989; Black and 
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Kraakman 1996). The contrast with corporate law in many civil law jurisdictions is stark. 
German law, for example, explicitly states that all provisions of the corporate law are 
mandatory, except where otherwise stated.2 Still, in common law countries, courts have 
upheld the principles of fiduciary duty as the mandatory legal concept shareholders may 
not opt out of - a highly enabling corporate law not withstanding.  
The same qualities that make the concept of fiduciary so resilient over time make it 
extremely difficult to transplant laws relevant to fiduciary duty from one legal system to 
other legal systems. The meaning of fiduciary duty is embedded knowledge that cannot 
be easily transplanted. Cases brought in different jurisdictions will differ and require 
different responses from judges, and given their past and constraints of their own legal 
system, judges in transplant countries are likely to resolve them differently.  
The process of legal reform in transition economies so far has entailed primarily the 
transplantation of statutory law from Western European or US legal sources. Even when 
US law was taken as a model, the role of courts was kept at bay, as they were regarded as 
weak, incompetent or even corrupt (Black and Kraakman 1996). In this paper, we ask 
whether a superior mode of transplantation might be the copying of lawmaking and law 
enforcement mechanisms. We address this question drawing on our earlier work on the 
incompleteness of law (Pistor and Xu 2002a; Pistor and Xu 2002b). We argue that law is 
intrinsically incomplete, that is, the law cannot unambiguously stipulate all future 
harmful actions and associated degree of punishments. When law is incomplete, the 
effectiveness of law is contingent on how a legal system deals with the right to determine 
the content and meaning of incomplete law in the future, i.e. how it allocates the residual 
lawmaking and law enforcement rights. Allocating broad residual lawmaking rights to 
                                                 
2 Compare Art. 23 Section V. of the Law on Joint Stock Companies (AktG). 
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courts enables them to adapt the law over time to new cases as they arise. Our theory 
suggests that this allocation of residual lawmaking and law enforcement rights is optimal 
as long as the expected harm does not have externalities.    
The effectiveness of the courts’ residual lawmaking rights, of course, depends on the 
willingness of victims to bring cases to court, which in turn depends on the actual or 
perceived quality of the courts. If courts are weak, they may not be effective residual 
lawmakers and law enforcers, even if they are vested with extensive residual lawmaking 
rights. We argue that an ultimate solution to those problems is to strengthen the courts 
and attempts to circumvent the courts will not work.  
We use statutory and case law from several jurisdictions, including two transition 
economies (Poland, and Russia) and one developed market economy (Germany) to 
identify the allocation of residual lawmaking and law enforcement rights, and to assess 
the ability of courts to address cases that were brought before them. A hallmark of all 
three jurisdictions is that case law is scarce (including in Germany). We attribute this to 
the failure of the legal system to clearly allocate residual lawmaking rights to courts. The 
scarcity of case law implies that courts by and large have little experience in dealing with 
cases that require a complex assessment of the rights and wrongs of corporate conduct. 
This lack of exposure may well account for the problems we identify in the decisions we 
analyze.  
 
Part II: Theoretical Framework 
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 In this part of the paper we offer a theoretical framework for analyzing the role of 
courts in determining the contents of fiduciary duties and for exploring alternatives to 
judge made law in this area.  
  
1. Incompleteness of Law  
We suggest that law is intrinsically incomplete, because lawmakers are ex ante unable 
to foresee all future contingencies and specify solutions for them. A similar argument has 
been made in the economics literature with regards to contracts: parties to a contract 
cannot foresee all future contingencies and therefore cannot write a complete contract 
(Hart, 1995). A law is a grand social contract in that it attempts to offer legal guidance for 
future outcomes to unlimited future generations of citizens. In countries governed by the 
rule of law, law is purposefully designed to address a large number of cases and to last 
for long periods of time. The use of abstract language in statutory law is a means to 
ensure its generality. Even case law is made not only for the specific case at hand, but the 
court’s ruling equally applies to other cases with a similar (not necessarily identical) 
factual basis (Ginsburg 1996).  
If contractual parties cannot write complete contracts, lawmakers should be even less 
able to write complete laws. In fact, to write a – hypothetical – complete law, lawmakers 
would not only need unlimited foresight with regards to future events, but should be 
blessed with unbounded rationality. They would need to be able to anticipate the impact 
of the rules they make on all potential parties concerned and write rules that can achieve 
the first best results from a social welfare perspective.  
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The notion that law is ambiguous or indeterminate has long been recognized in the 
legal literature (Hart 1961; Solum 1999). Thus, the claim that law is incomplete is not a 
novelty to most lawyers. What our theory seeks to add, however, is that in light of the 
incompleteness of law it is necessary to allocate residual lawmaking and law enforcement 
rights in order to ensure effective law enforcement.  
The classic law and economics literature on law enforcement is based on Becker’s 
groundbreaking work (Becker 1968; Polinsky and Shavell 2000). The intuition is that law 
is fully deters and thus is self-enforcing, if the level of punishment and the probability of 
being caught is designed to be sufficiently high. Stigler clarified that excessive 
punishment may not be optimal, but that the level of punishment should be optimally 
related to the level of violation (Stigler 1970). Then, at equilibrium, violations by rational 
players do not occur.  
The implicit premise of this literature is that the law is complete and that all 
punishable actions are unambiguously stipulated in the law.3 Under this assumption, the 
major problem faced by a legal system is to design appropriate sanctions and to decide 
how much to spend on law enforcement so as to deter violation.4  If we relax this 
assumption and start from the premise that law is inherently incomplete, the deterrence 
effect of laws will be lowered and laws will not be self-enforcing. The reason is that 
under incomplete law the scope of applicability of the law becomes blurred. Given the 
                                                 
3 While one may argue that this problem is captured by the probability of being caught, the incompleteness 
and enforcement probability issues are distinct. Incomplete law refers to the scenario that even if all 
evidence is established that someone committed a certain act, he may not be punished, because it is unclear 
whether the law actually captures that particular action. By contrast, the typical enforcement question is 
whether evidence can be established to convict a person or hold him liable under civil law assuming that 
the action is actually punishable.  
4 As Polinsky and Shavell (2000) show, the literature has addressed numerous related issues, including risk-
averseness of agents, the possible impact of errors in the enforcement process, information costs, and the 
costs of enforcement. We ignore these aspects for the sake of clarity of the argument 
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nature of law – laws are designed to address many and for long periods of time by 
lawmakers who cannot anticipate all socioeconomic and technological change – the reach 
of the law and its applicability to particular cases may be challenged or questioned. As a 
consequence, law cannot effectively deter.   
Facing the problem of intrinsically incomplete law, lawmakers essentially have two 
options. First, lawmakers may establish a broad general norm, a catch-all clause that may 
be used to sanction actions that are not foreseeable at the time the law is made, but that 
might result in the type of outcome that the law seeks to prevent (Type I incompleteness). 
Type I incomplete law is similar to norms or standards, the terms that are commonly used 
in the legal literature (Kaplow 1992; Kaplow 1997). Second, lawmakers may attempt to 
capture as many contingencies as possible in statutory law. This type of law specifies 
actions, outcomes or a combination of actions and outcomes that will trigger liability 
and/or punishment and strives to be as comprehensive as possible (Type II 
incompleteness). Type II incomplete laws resemble rules in the conventional 
terminology.  
There is also a third option. Given the difficulties involved in writing complete laws, 
lawmakers could dispense with lawmaking altogether and leave contractual parties to 
determine their relations by contract rather than law. In light of the fact that contracts are  
incomplete, however, this cannot be the end of the story. If we accept the notion that 
contracts are incomplete, all rights that are not explicitly contracted out, the so-called 
residual rights, need to be allocated. The holder of residual rights, the owner, has the right 
to decide issues not explicitly provided for in the contract. Yet the scope of these rights 
may be in dispute. Indeed, case law concerning property rights gives ample evidence that 
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there is much demand for clarifying the scope of property rights (Komesar 2001). There 
is thus a need for a third party arbiter to determine the scope and contents of residual 
rights. The obvious authority for determining the delineation of residual and contractual 
rights is the law, not contracts, because the very existence of property rights is explained 
with the incompleteness of contracts. If, as we postulate, law is also incomplete, then the 
law’s authority is not perfect. Nevertheless, by allocating residual lawmaking rights, legal 
systems can ensure that future questions can at least be addressed within a given legal 
framework. 
The two strategies of lawmaking under incomplete law – writing open-ended standard 
or writing a very detailed law, or rule, aimed at encompassing as many contingencies as 
possible, will both produce incomplete law, albeit for different reasons. Broad legal 
standards create substantial uncertainties as to which actions will be considered a cause 
for liability or sanction, and which will not. For individual actors, this uncertainty could 
undermine the deterrence effect of the law, as they may gamble that their action will not 
be punished. The opposite outcome may also occur, as actors may be sufficiently deterred 
by the likelihood that their action could fall within the scope of the law. The point is that 
the uncertainty over the reach of the law renders it highly incomplete.  
The concept of fiduciary duty discussed in this paper is an example of a law that is 
incomplete because it is broad and its scope is difficult to determine without referring to 
factual situations. We propose that such a broad, incomplete law can be made effective 
only by allocating residual lawmaking rights to the agent that is charged with enforcing 
the law. When the facts of the case are revealed, someone has to decide whether the 
relevant actions and outcomes were of the type the law sought to prevent. One may call 
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this “interpretation” of the law, rather than lawmaking, but the action certainly entails 
more than only enforcement. 
The second lawmaking strategy will result in incomplete law, because it is impossible 
for the law to include all future contingencies. Thus, there will always be cases outside 
the scope of the law. For all actions and/or outcomes that are captured by the law, the law 
will be easy to administer, and the law will give the appearance of being fairly complete. 
Still, for many actions, it will be questionable, whether they fall within the scope of that 
law, and others might be clearly outside its scope. Failure of the law to capture these 
cases implies that the law is incomplete. Type II incomplete law creates problems when 
confronted with substantial socioeconomic and or technological change. Absent such 
change, it may be possible to write highly complete law on the basis of the accumulated 
knowledge of typical actions that cause harm.  
By the mid nineteenth century, for example, most legal systems had developed 
criminal law that could quite effectively deal with thieves who appropriated other 
peoples’ property. After the invention and increasingly extensive use of electricity, the 
question arose, whether the unauthorized use of electricity would qualify as “stealing” 
electricity. Some courts denied this, because electricity lacked the asset quality required 
by the relevant theft provision, while others argued that the asset quality was less relevant 
than the ability to appropriate whatever the object of theft might be. Still other systems 
broadened the relevant theft provisions by including “theft of services” (Pistor and Xu 
2002a).  
In parallel to the incompleteness of contract literature, we call the right to deal with 
future contingencies of exiting law, i.e. the right to interpret the law, to apply it to 
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different cases, and to establish new precedents, residual lawmaking rights. Residual 
lawmaking rights may be retained by the legislature. Alternatively, they may be vested 
with law enforcement agencies, such as courts, or regulators. The following section 
explores alternative allocations of residual lawmaking rights and their implication for the 
effectiveness of law enforcement.  
 
2. The Allocation of Residual Lawmaking and Law Enforcement Rights 
 
Civil Law vs. Common Law  
It is clear that the principle of fiduciary is a highly incomplete legal principle that it is 
very general and is subject to many different interpretations. To ensure an effective 
enforcement of fiduciary duty, residual lawmaking and law enforcement (LMLE) rights 
must be allocated. We start our analysis from general difference of LMLE rights between 
civil law and common law countries. 
Common law countries tend to vest substantial lawmaking rights with courts. Courts 
are explicitly acknowledged as a source of law and thus exercise not only residual, but 
also original lawmaking rights.5 In fact, the common law is primarily judge-made law. By 
contrast, civil law countries tend to vest less lawmaking rights with the courts. The 
official doctrine to this day is that judges interpret, but that they do not make the law.  
It is now widely acknowledged that there is a substantial degree of convergence 
between the two systems, as courts in civil law countries have been called upon to adapt 
old laws to an ever changing world, and common law jurisdictions have over time made 
                                                 
5 Original lawmaking rights imply the right to stipulate the principles of law, to write new rules, not only 
the right to interpret or adapt them. 
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increasing use of statutory law (Zweigert and Kötz 1998). Nevertheless, it is probably fair 
to say that common law judges have and practice more extensive lawmaking rights than 
civil law judges.  
By implication, civil law countries need to invest more resources into writing highly 
specific law, but still face the risk of under-enforcement should they fail to anticipate 
future actions that may result in substantial harm. Alternatively, they may complement 
reallocating residual lawmaking rights to different agents, such as regulators. Seen in this 
light, the widely held notion that civil law countries regulate more than common law 
countries (La Porta et al. 1999; Mahoney 2001) could be explained within the framework 
of our theory: Given the commitment not to allocate residual lawmaking rights to courts, 
civil law countries respond to under-enforcement problems by allocating these rights to 
administrative and regulatory bodies. By contrast, the broad residual lawmaking rights 
exercised judges in common law countries enjoy, ensure that potentially any dispute can 
be resolved in a court of law. Since the coverage of formal law and legal dispute 
resolution mechanisms is thus virtually complete, there may be less need for regulation 
unless there is a serious social need.6 Obviously, this proposition requires further 
substantiation.7   
It is possible that in civil law countries judges assume greater lawmaking rights over 
time. In fact, German contract or tort law gives ample evidence of the ability of judges to 
                                                 
6 In our parallel work we explain that this need arises when actions are likely to have a substantial impact 
on society as whole (not only on the parties they transact with). See (Pistor and Xu 2002a; Pistor and Xu 
2002b). 
7 Indeed, there is substantial prima facie evidence to the contrary. Note, for example, that the US was the 
first country to establish an antitrust regulator (1914) and a federal securities market regulator (1933) and 
exported these models to civil law countries, such as Germany (antitrust) and Japan (antitrust and 
securities) after World War II. 
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do so.8 Still, as long as the scope of the courts’ lawmaking rights remains uncertain, this 
will influence the willingness of private parties to bring cases to court when it is unclear 
whether a court would hear a case or solve it, even when evidence can be established. It 
has been suggested that if the outcome of a court case is clearly predictable, parties will 
tend to settle out of court.9 However, from this does not follow that parties are willing to 
incur the costs of litigation whenever the outcome is uncertain. This is the case only, 
when courts have the residual lawmaking rights to deal with cases the outcome of which 
cannot be derived from looking at statutory or past case law, as there is at least hope that 
courts will resolve the case in the interest of the plaintiff. By contrast, when the scope of 
the courts’ residual lawmaking rights is questionable, it may not be worth the expense to 
get the courts involved to begin with.  
There may be good reasons for minimizing courts’ residual lawmaking rights. This is 
true in particular in the context of a political and/or economic regime change, when 
countries confront the dilemma of having to deal with institutions and judges vested in 
the past while trying to change the overall system and behavior (Pistor 2000a). Judges 
appointed by the previous regime may be too politicized to be entrusted with the task of 
residual lawmaking rights in such an environment. This reasoning has certainly been 
invoked to explain the codification of law in France after the French Revolution (Cooter 
1996; Glendon, Gordon, and Osakwe 1994). Transition economies today face an equally 
difficult problem. Replacing the judges in such cases is a difficult proposition, as this 
                                                 
8 Courts have developed legal institutions that have no basis in the civil code, such as “culpa in 
contrahendo”, “positive Vertragsverletzung”, and have shifted the burden of proof to achieve stricter 
liability in tort cases, all in response to problems that were revealed by cases brought before them. 
9 (Priest and Klein 1984). 
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might undermine the principle of judicial independence and could create moral hazard 
problems for establishing a truly independent judiciary in the future.10  
In addition, judges may lack the training in new laws or even a basic understanding of 
the underpinnings of the new political or economic regime that is evolving. These 
considerations have led the drafters of the Russian corporate law to design a law that in 
their view would be self-enforcing (Black and Kraakman 1996). The strategy for building 
a self-enforcing law was to stress the importance of procedural over substantive rules. 
The hope was that by allocating decision-making rights to the parties in the corporate 
enterprise, in particular to shareholders, the need to involve judges in the enforcement of 
the law would be reduced.  
While the model is intuitively attractive and generated much attention from policy 
advisors in emerging markets, in light of our incompleteness of law claim, it has serious 
limitations. A complete procedural rule would need to state unambiguously the 
procedural rights allocated to different parties. This is the easier task. It is fairly 
straightforward to determine which stakeholders have voting or approval rights, the right 
to request information, or to exit a firm. To be complete, however, the law would also 
need to state unambiguously the issues or events that will trigger these procedural rights. 
Given incompleteness of law, this is an impossible task. As a result, residual lawmaking 
rights need to be allocated to determine whether or not the facts of the case trigger the 
procedural rights that are stipulated in the law. 
 
                                                 
10 This argument notwithstanding, a number of transition economies dismissed all judges and made the 
reappointment subject to some screening for their past conduct (lustration). Some jurisdictions, including 
the states of Saxony and Berlin in Eastern Germany, precluded judges who had enforced political criminal 
law from reappointment altogether. For an overview of these practices, see (Pistor 1995a).  
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Court vs. Regulators 
With respect to law enforcement, facing incomplete law a better solution might be to 
allocate residual lawmaking rights to other agencies rather than courts (Pistor and Xu 
2002a; Pistor and Xu 2002b).  We argue that in countries governed by the rule of law 
courts are designed to be neutral arbiters, impartial and subject only to the law.  This 
implies that courts are only reactive law enforcers. Courts do not initiate enforcement 
proceedings, but have to wait until an action has been brought by aggrieved parties or by 
the state. By issuing a preliminary injunction, courts can enforce the law before harm has 
been done, but they cannot on their own behalf initiate proceedings for preliminary 
injunctions or final rulings. Giving courts the right to initiate legal proceedings would 
undermine their impartiality and turn them into regulators.  
By contrast, regulators are proactive law enforcers. They can initiate legal procedures 
on their own and enforce the law by, among others, enjoining actions, controlling entry, 
and imposing sanctions for violations of rules even before harm has been done. The 
residual lawmaking rights allocated to regulators allow them to fine tune and flexibly 
change regulations in response to changes in the environment. The same features that 
make regulators effective law enforcer, however, create the danger of excessive state 
intervention.  
The question, therefore, is not whether courts or regulators should be allocated 
residual lawmaking and law enforcement rights, but to define the conditions under which 
it may be advantageous to allocate regulators those rights. Glaeser, Johnson and Shleifer 
(2001) suggest that regulators are superior whenever costly investments are required from 
law enforcers, but it is difficult to induce them to make such investments. The thrust of 
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their argument is that if collecting evidence in law enforcement is costly and law 
enforcers need to be given incentives, regulators are superior to courts, because they can 
be better incentivized through punishment and reward mechanisms.  
According to our theory, the choice between regulators and courts depends on the 
degree of incompleteness and the severity of externalities that may result from harmful 
actions. Rapid socioeconomic and/or technological change, which renders law highly 
incomplete, paired with far reaching externalities that result from harmful actions make a 
case for shifting residual lawmaking and law enforcement rights from reactive to 
proactive enforcement institutions, i.e. from courts to regulators. By contrast, if 
individual actions do not generate great externalities, even when law is highly 
incomplete, allocating lawmaking and law enforcement rights to the courts is superior. 
Law enforcement related to fiduciary duties is such an example. Fiduciary duties 
govern the relationship among stakeholders in a particular undertaking (i.e., management 
vs. shareholders, blockholders vs. minority shareholders). The harm done when these 
duties are violated is typically confined to the very same stakeholders. Reactive law 
enforcement can compensate those that have actually incurred damages. Law 
enforcement by regulators may not only not be necessary, but even harmful, because it is 
extremely difficult to stipulate ex ante the type of actions that may result in harm. 
Allowing regulators to proactively enforce the law in these cases would likely result in 
excessive intervention in the operation of private businesses. As a result, not only can the 
direct cost of regulation be high without enhancing the effectiveness of law, the indirect 
costs as a result of misguided regulation can also be high. Therefore, reallocating residual 
lawmaking rights to regulators does not appear to be a viable solution. 
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In contrast, financial market regulation is an area where the case can be made that 
lawmaking and law enforcement by regulators is superior. Financial markets evolve 
rapidly implying that law will almost always be highly incomplete in deterring actions 
that may result in harm. The expected harm may include a market crash, which damages 
confidence in market developments and thus undermines the proper functioning of 
financial markets. This harm is not easily undone, because compensation of few investors 
will not compensate for extern reinstall market confidence.  
In the case of enforcing fiduciary duty principle, the most important effect of 
allocating lawmaking and law enforcement rights to courts is that related matters become 
justiciable, signaling that the relevant disputes can be resolved in law. This proposition is 
fully consistent with the finding of the studies by La Porta et al. (1997; 1998), which 
show that common law countries have less concentrated ownership than do civil law 
countries. From the vantage point of our theory we would interpret their evidence by 
saying that in civil law countries a legal vacuum is created by the absence of lawmaking 
and law enforcement rights vested with the courts. To protect their rights, investors 
therefore take larger stakes (Shleifer and Vishny 1997).  
An interesting case to apply our framework to is the so-called Delaware puzzle. The 
puzzle is that companies incorporated in Delaware reveal higher market value than 
companies incorporated elsewhere in the U.S. (Daines 2001), despite the fact that the 
Delaware statutory law is rather weak in protecting shareholder rights (Arsht 1976; Cary 
1976; Larcom 1937). In fact, Delaware statutory law is not a stellar performer on the 
scale of shareholder rights identified by La Porta et al.11 Several authors have already 
                                                 
11 The 1-share-1-vote rule is only optional, shares can be blocked before the meeting; cumulative voting is 
only optional; preemptive rights require explicit recognition in the corporate charter. Delaware does, 
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suggested that the solution for this puzzle lies in the function of the Delaware courts 
(Coffee 1989; Daines 2001; Fisch 2000). Our argument is similar. The fact that courts 
exercised lawmaking and law enforcement rights and that – perhaps because of the 
enabling nature of the corproate law – they were increasingly called upon to resolve 
disputes, they developed a large volume of cases law. In doing so they have made 
specified the meaning of the principle of fiduciary duty over time, or made the principle 
more complete. Given the higher level of completeness of the case (not the statutory) law, 
shareholders are better protected in Delaware than in other states that do no have an 
equally comprehensive body of law. The same argument would explain, why other states 
have not found it easy to emulate the Delaware example by simply copying her law, or 
even using Delaware case law as a guidance. When law is incomplete, judges play an 
important role in interpreting the law. Knowledge of the judges’ previous approaches to 
case law and of the expertise of judges who specialize in a particular area of the law will 
make it easier investors and their attorneys to predict the outcome of a case and thus for 
them to bring a case to court, if necessary. Copying statutory or case law cannot replicate 
this. 
 
Alternative Legal Strategies 
Rather than searching for formal legal solution, it would be possible to leave broad 
areas outside the scope of formal law, as social norms may govern more effectively and a 
fewer costs (Bernstein 1992; Ellickson 1991). This applies also in the area of corporate 
law (Rock and Wachter 2001). However, the strength of these non-legal mechanisms 
                                                                                                                                                 
however, offer proxy by mail, the right to call an extraordinary shareholder meeting to 10% shareholders, 
and – in our view most importantly – the right to shareholders to take management to court. 
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depends at least in part on the available of recourse to the formal legal system, as many 
informal enforcement mechanisms operate in the shadow of the law (Charny 1990). We 
suggest that the power of the fiduciary duty principles rests on the fact that they offer an 
avenue to formal dispute settlement as an effective fall back option should non-legal 
enforcement mechanisms break down. Leaving these issues outside the formal legal 
system gives those that hold the de facto powers – i.e. incumbant management or 
blockholders – effective control rights (Pistor 1995b).  
 
To summarize, our basic argument is that the principle of fiduciary is a highly 
incomplete legal principle (Type I incompleteness). To ensure effective law enforcement, 
residual lawmaking and law enforcement rights must be allocated. Since the actions that 
may violate fiduciary duty principles do not lend themselves well to standardization and 
the expected harm affects primarily the company’s shareholders, not investors or society 
more broadly, residual lawmaking and reactive law enforcement by courts is optimal. 
 
Part III: Case Law From Civil Law Jurisdiction 
 
In this part, we analyze relevant case law using the theory summarized in the previous 
section. We focus on cases, which, in the Anglo-Saxon context, would be analyzed under 
the rubric of fiduciary duty. Conflict of interest cases (violation of the duty of loyalty) are 
of particular interest, because they pose a greater challenge to courts in differentiating 
acceptable from unacceptable behavior, but duty of care cases have also been included.12   
                                                 
12 See the main Polish case presented below. A conflict of interest case was simply not available. 
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In transition economies, case law is only emerging, and in many countries not a single 
case concerning the violation of fiduciary duty has been reported at the higher courts. 
Given the scarcity of case law, it is difficult to predict, whether the few cases that we 
have seen are indicative of future trends. At least, they allow us to take a glance at the 
evolving law.  
The only non-transition country included is Germany. German law has long 
influenced the development of statutory civil and commercial law in Central and Eastern 
Europe (Pistor 2000b). It is therefore reasonable to assume that German case law may 
also gain influence in countries that borrowed German statutory law. In this sense, the 
analysis of German case law on fiduciary duty may hold important clues for the evolving 
case law in transition economies. But there is another, potentially more important, reason 
for including German case law in this analysis. While German courts for the most part 
follow the general doctrine prevalent in civil law jurisdictions that courts interpret, but 
that they do not make law, on occasion courts have used broad principles such as 
fairness, or even fiduciary duty, to correct results that would follow from a rigid 
application of statutory law. Given the relative scarcity of case law, however, it remains 
difficult to predict when they choose to do so. Litigants certainly are still cautious as 
evidenced by the fact that case law that recognized principles of fiduciary duty or gave 
shareholders better standing in courts were not followed by a flood of litigation.13 Thus, 
the German example give pause to think about the implication of withholding residual 
lawmaking rights from courts. It implies that courts will not be exposed to cases and thus 
                                                 
13 The Holzmueller decision of the German Supreme Court of 1982 (BGHZ 83, 122) was widely expected 
to lead to a significant increase in litigation, because it recognized a procedural right of shareholders to sue 
when their rights are seriously infringed.  
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cannot engage in a learning process themselves. Failure to explicitly allocate residual 
lawmaking rights thus results in path-dependent under-enforcement of law. 
 
1. Poland 
Poland recently enacted a new corporate law.14 Case law currently available rests on 
the Commercial Code (CC), which originally was enacted in 1933 and formed the basis 
for the evolving post-socialist corporate law. We therefore base the following analysis on 
the CC. The code included almost identical provisions on the liability of managers and 
directors in closed and publicly traded corporation. Art. 474 CC on publicly traded 
corporations reads: 
 
1. A member of the company's governing bodies and the liquidator are liable to 
the company for damage caused by their actions which are contrary to the law or 
the provisions in the Company Statute.  
 2. A member of the company's governing bodies and the liquidator are liable to 
the company for any damage caused as a result of their failure to exercise the care 
of a diligent trader.  
 
 The key issue is what is meant by “diligent trader”, a term we would call a typical 
example of Type I incomplete law.15 No further specifications can be found in the law, 
leaving it ultimately to courts to decide this issue, provided, of course, that procedural 
rules exist ensure that management can be take to court in case it violates the duties of a 
“diligent trader”. Sec. 474 explicitly states that directors are liable to the corporation, not 
to shareholders directly. In principle, the corporation must take action against members of 
the governing bodies. But the corporation would have to be represented by a governing 
                                                 
14 The new Companies Act was adopted 15 September 2002 and entered into force 1 January 2001. A 
German translation of the Act can be found in (Breidenbach 2001). 
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body, which would have to implicate itself (or one of its members), there are few 
incentives to bring actions. The old CC did, however, allow shareholders to bring an 
action on behalf of the corporation, if the corporation had failed to act itself for more than 
a year after having discovered the facts that give rise to liability claims (Sec. 477 CC).  
Given these procedural constraints, it is perhaps not surprising that case law has been 
scarce. As of June 2001, only two decisions concerning the liability of directors in a 
closely held corporation have been reported. One concerned the extent to which a director 
could use mismanagement by the defendant as an excuse for his own misconduct – which 
was rejected.16 Another concerned the appropriate standards of responsibility, when the 
manager is concurrently an employee of the corporation.17 For publicly traded 
corporations, there has not been a single ruling by the Polish Supreme Court. We 
therefore report a 1998 decision of the Katowice Court of Appeal.18 The decision deals 
with the duty of care of members of the board of directors. No claim of conflict of 
interests was made. 
The plaintiff was shareholder of the Bank Ślaski SA (the Bank). Defendants were 
members of the board of directors [management board] of the Bank.19 The bank was 
                                                                                                                                                 
15 For a definition of “incompleteness of law”, see below [].  
16 Supreme Court ruling IV CKN 117/00 of 9 May 2000: “It cannot be considered effective for a defendant 
to invoke the risk connected with carrying out a business activity as a reason to release him/her (according 
to the rules of contractual responsibility) from his/her liability towards a limited liability company based on 
Art. 292 §1 of the CC when the harm is a result of the improper management by the defendant of the 
company’s affairs. However, circumstances on the basis of which the harm could at most have been 
reversed are covered by risk.” 
17 Supreme Court Ruling I PKN 482/99 of 28 January 2000. In the case of an employee holding the position 
of member of the Management Board, while assessing his/her conduct as a serious infringement of the 
employee’s basic duties (art. 52 § 1 point 1 of the Labor Law), his/her obligation to exercise the care of a 
diligent trader (Art. 292 § 2 of the CC) must be taken into account. 
18 I Aca 322/98, 5 November 1998. 
19 Under Polish law, a corporation may have a two-tier management structure, consisting of a management 
board and a supervisory board. See Art. 377 CC. A corporation with share capital of less than PLN 500,000 
may choose between a supervisory board and an audit committee. Corporations that exceed the stipulated 
share capital must have a supervisory board. 
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privatized in 1994. A special unit inside the Bank, a brokerage house with substantial 
organizational and financial independence, was charged with organizing the issuance of 
shares. The task to supervise the activities of the brokerage house was delegated to one 
member of the board. When shares were offered in the privatization process, they were 
heavily over-subscribed. The Bank was unprepared for the demand for shares. In 
particular, it failed to set up appropriate organizational structures inside the bank.  
This failure constituted a violation of securities regulations and the Bank was indeed 
fined by the Polish Securities and Exchange Commission (KPWiG). The member of the 
board that had been in charge of supervising the issuance of shares was fired. In the case 
brought before the court, the plaintiff (a shareholder) demands that other members of the 
board reimburse the bank for the fine it had paid to the KPWiG. The defendants argue 
that they had fulfilled their obligations under the law by delegating the task of 
supervising the share issuance to one of their members and therefore were not liable. 
The court of first instance denied a course of action. Upon the plaintiff’s appeal, the 
Katowice Court of Appeal reversed the decision. The official summary of the court ruling 
states:  
“The care of a diligent trader should include: foreseeing the results of planned 
actions, undertaking all possible factual or legal measures in order to fulfill the 
obligation undertaken, showing foresight, conscientiousness, carefulness and care in 
order to achieve the results in accordance with the company’s interests. A large 
degree of independence of a brokerage house and its financial and organizational 
separation, which allowed it to make decisions by itself, did not exclude it from the 
supervision of the bank, and the manager of the office was appointed and dismissed 
by the bank’s management board. To designate one of the members of the bank’s 
management board to supervise the activities of the brokerage house should normally 
not release the remaining management board members’ from their responsibility in 
this respect.”20 
 
                                                 
20 The translation of the summary was provided by Prof. Soltysynski. 
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Essentially, the court replaced one highly incomplete term with a set of others 
sufficiently broad to be used to hold members of the governing bodies of the corporation 
liable for virtually any conduct that ultimately results in harm. After all, the wording the 
court used suggests that they are required to undertake all possible factual or legal 
measures to further the interests of the corporation. This ruling will therefore be of little 
guidance for managers and lower courts alike when determining in future case law, which 
actions – or failures to take action – should result in legal liability. In fact, as stated, it 
may deter risk taking on the one hand, and organizational means as those taken by Bank 
Ślaski SA, on the other, if such measures will not restrict the liability of board members.  
The decision documents a lack of experience with corporate decision making 
processes and reluctance by the court to develop criteria to delineating actions that should 
result in personal liability from those that should not. In light of the fact that common law 
courts have taken many decades to develop a body of case law, this may not be 
surprising. The point is that transition economies need to catch up fast to address the 
subtler problems of corporate governance. Procedural rules that make it difficult to bring 
court actions, do not facilitate this learning process. A possible solution could be to carve 
out aspects of fiduciary duty that lend themselves to greater specification in the law. This 
attempt has been tried in Russia, as will be discussed in the following section. 
 
2. Russia 
Russia enacted its law on joint stock companies in 1996. The law is based on a draft 
developed with by American legal experts, including Professors Black and Kraakman 
(Black and Kraakman 1996; Black, Kraakman, and Hay 1996). While it has many traces 
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of American corporate law, it is not a simple copy. Instead, the authors sought to create a 
new type of corporate law, one that would rest primarily on procedural rather than 
substantive provisions to ensure that shareholders could self-enforce the law and would 
not have to rely on courts that are depicted as slow, incompetent, and corrupt. The law 
avoids broad encompassing concepts and instead attempts to spell out the rights and 
obligations of shareholders and directors in great detail. The law does not codify the 
principle of fiduciary duty. An explanation that has been put forward is that Russian 
language does not have words that would adequately capture the concept (Black, 
Kraakman, and Tarassova 2000) – which may be taken as an important indicator that the 
very concept of fiduciary relationships, and not only the law, is not well developed. 
Another reason is that the law purports to educate shareholders, managers, and the public 
about corporate conduct and therefore favors specificity over generality. Finally, Russian 
lawmakers may have been wary to include broad provisions that would vest courts with 
substantial residual lawmaking rights.21 
As in Poland, case law is only emerging. Until 1998, cases that reached the Supreme 
Arbitrazh Court (SAC) in Moscow were still based on the old corporate law. In the 
majority of cases concerning violations of shareholder rights the corporations brought 
actions demanding to void contracts that had been entered into in violation of provisions 
that required approval by all members of the board or the shareholder meeting. It appears 
that litigation was thus used strategically for the company to escape contractual liability, 
not for shareholders to enforce their rights (Kursynsky-Singer 1999).  
                                                 
21 In fact, Professor Black, one of the co-drafters of the law suggested that the legislature eliminated 
references to broader judicial power in an earlier draft.  
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The new corporate law carved out certain aspects of the fiduciary, namely 
transactions in which a director or one of his affiliates has an interest. The law defines 
factors that suggest an “interest”, establishes procedures for approving transactions 
should there be a conflict, and stipulates that violations of these rules lead to liability of 
the relevant persons vis-à-vis the company or to voidance of the transactions.  
Art. 71 of the 1996 Russian Law on Joint Stock Companies (JSCL) states in section 1 
that  
“The members of a company’s board of directors (supervisory board), the company’s 
individual executive organ (director, general director) and (or) members of the 
company’s collegial executive organ (managing board, directorate) and equally the 
managing organization or manager when exercising their rights and fulfilling their duties 
must act in the interest of the company, exercising their rights and fulfilling their duties 
with regard to the company in good faith and reasonable”.22  
 
The SAC has not had an opportunity yet to determine the meaning of good faith and 
reasonableness. However, it has dealt already with a several cases concerning violations 
of conflict of interest. The legal basis for these cases can be found in Arts. 81-84 JSCL.23 
The fact that legal provisions that stipulate in substantial detail actions that may give rise 
to liability resulted in litigation, while provisions that establish management obligations 
in broad, ambiguous terms have not, is an interesting point to note. It supports our claim 
that if the scope of the courts’ residual lawmaking rights is ill-defined, potential litigants 
will be reluctant to incur the costs of litigation.  
                                                 
22 For this and the following excerpts from the law, the English language translation by Black and 
Tarassova in (Black, Kraakman, and Tarassova 1998) was used. 
23 Several U.S. jurisdictions have also codified conflict of interest situations. See Delaware General 
Corporate Law § 144. Note, however, that the Delaware law precludes the voidance or voidability of 
transactions concluded by interested directors, if their interest was disclosed and the transaction was overall 
“fair” – introducing another broad concept that requires fine-tuning by case law. For a much more detailed 
elaboration on conditions that lead to a conflict of interest, see § 8.60-8.63 of the Revised Model Business 
Corporation Act.  
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Art. 81 defines an interest in a company’s completion of a transaction. The relevant 
persons who might have an interest include the members of the board(s), or 
shareholder(s) holding together with affiliated person(s) 20 or more percent of the 
company’s voting shares. An interest exists, if these persons, their spouses, parents, 
children, brothers, sisters, and all their affiliated persons 
- Are a party to this transaction or participate in it in the capacity of representative 
or intermediary; 
- possess 20 or more percent of the voting shares (participatory shares, units) of a 
juridical person that is a party to the transaction or participates in it in the 
capacity of representative or intermediary; 
- occupies an official position in the management organs of a juridical person that 
is a party to the transaction or participates in it in the capacity of representative 
or intermediary. 
 
The effort to write a highly complete law notwithstanding, the conditions that indicate 
an interest all contain terms and concepts that require further interpretation, or are 
incomplete. For example, they require that someone must act “in the capacity of 
representative or intermediary.” They do not simply stipulate “the general director” or “a 
member of the board”, anticipating that others may be acting as agents of the corporation 
and thus could find themselves in a conflict of interest situation. Thus, while the general 
attempt is to write Type II incomplete law, many of the terms used contain elements of 
Type I incompleteness.  
The interested person must disclose her interest to the supervisory board, inspection 
commission and auditors. Transactions that are affected by an interest must be approved 
by a majority vote of the company’s disinterested directors.  In case the company has 
more than 1,000 shareholders, the directors making the decision must be both 
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disinterested and independent.24 Moreover, it must be established that the value the 
company will receive for property alienated or services delivered does not exceed market 
value, or – conversely – that the value of the property acquired or services accepted is not 
below market value.25  
A decision by the disinterested and/or independent directors is not sufficient in all 
cases. Whenever the total payment in the transaction and the value of the property that is 
the subject of the transaction (…) exceeds two percent of the company’s assets, 
or when the transaction and (or) several transactions interrelated among themselves 
consists of issuance of voting shares of the company or other securities convertible into 
voting shares, in an amount exceeding two percent of the company’s previously issued 
voting shares, the decision shall be taken by the Shareholder Meeting. Exceptions to this 
rule include a loan given by the interested person to the company, or cases where the 
transaction is completed  
“in the process of ordinary economic activity between the company and another 
party, which had been in place before the moment after which the interested person is 
deemed to be interested”. 
 
                                                 
24 An independent director is defined as “a member of the company’s board of directors (supervisory board) 
who is not the company’s individual executive organ (director, general director) or a member of the 
company’s collegial executive organ (managing board, directorate), if during this his spouse, parents, 
children brothers, and sisters are not persons occupying official positions in the company’s management 
organs.” Art. 83 Section 2 para 2 JSCLruss. 
25 See Art. 83 Section 2 para 3. The provision makes explicit reference to Art. 77 of the JSCL, which 
explains how to determine market value in an economy that is still in transition from a centrally planned 
economy: “The market value of property, including the value of a company’s shares or other securities, is 
the price at which a seller having full information about the value of the property and not obliged to sell, 
would agree to sell it, and a buyer having full information about the value of the property and not obliged to 
acquire the property would agree to acquire it” (Art. 77 JSCL). The law goes on to say that the market 
value is determined by the company’s board of directors (supervisory board).  
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Violations of the above provisions have two legal consequences. First, the transaction 
may be deemed void (Art. 84 Sec. 1). Second, the interested person is liable to the 
company for the amount of losses that he caused to the company (Art. 84 Sec. 2).26  
An action for the invalidation of contracts can be filed by shareholders as well as by 
the parties to the transaction, i.e. the corporation that was represented by the person who 
had an interest, as well as the other party. The SAC had to clarify that organizations that 
were not a party to the transaction, including the company’s creditors, had no right to file 
for invalidation of such transactions.27  
An interesting feature of the Russian legal system is that even in what appears to be a 
private law matter, a state agent may get involved and either bring an action or launch an 
appeal against a court decision. This agent is the so-called procuracy, an institution that 
dates back to the time of Peter the Great (Butler 1988). The procuracy has a mandate to 
ensure legality and to safeguard public interest. The relevant statute states that the 
procurator has the right to apply to court with a statement or to get involved in a case at 
whatever stage of the process, if that is required to protect the rights of citizens, the 
interests of society, or the state.28 Moreover, the Arbitration Procedure Code explicitly 
refers to the procurator’s right to lodge a civil suit to protect the interests of state and 
society. 
Within our framework, the procurator is an institution that resembles a regulator in 
that it can initiate legal actions. Unlike regulators, however, procurators do not take part 
in lawmaking activities. There are examples for similar institutions in Western legal 
                                                 
26 In other words, Russia combines the liability with the property rule. For the distinction of self-dealing 
rules and their legal consequences along these lines, see (Goshen 2001). 
27 Ibid under 17 at p. []. 
28 Art. 3 of the Federal Law on the Procurator’s Office of the Russian Federation.  
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systems. Under the U.S. Sherman Act of 1890, the Department of Justice (its attorneys) 
was given the right to bring criminal or civil actions against violators of the Act. 
Similarly, apart from launching investigations, the SEC can initiate legal proceedings in 
court against legal violators. The main difference is the broad, ambiguously defined 
powers of the procurator to bring actions to protect the interests of state and society. This 
is clearly an incomplete term, and one that gives the procurator substantial discretion in 
intervening in private affairs. While it is ultimately up to the courts to decide on the 
merits of such actions, it is questionable, whether a state initiation agent with such 
sweeping powers is desirable. From a law enforcement perspective, the answer could be 
yes based on the grounds that such an institution can greatly enhance enforcement. Still, 
there is the danger of over-deterrence both of the transactions that are challenged in court 
and of bringing a case to court. As we argued above, the reallocation of the right to 
initiate actions from private parties to state agents should therefore be limited to cases 
where the failure to initiate proceedings may result in substantial harm to others beyond 
the immediate parties to the transaction.  
Cases where the procurator initiated a lawsuit on the grounds that management 
violated its obligations towards shareholders have not been reported. In a recent survey of 
judicial practice concerning the conflict of interest provisions of the JSCL, the SAC 
summarizes the legal issues that arose in case law.29 In all cases the legal remedy sought 
was voidance of the contract rather than liability of the interested persons. In contrast to 
the case law brought under the previous law, however, not all cases were brought by the 
                                                 
29 Obsor praktiki pazrescheniia sporov, sviazannykh s zakliucheniem khoziaistvennymi obschestvami 
krupnykh sdelok i sdelok, v soverschenii kotorykh imeetcia zainteresovannost’ (Survey of practical 
decisions of disputes related to the conclusion of major transactions and transactions affected by conflict of 
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corporation, but several cases were filed by disgruntled shareholders. The fact that they 
sued for voidance rather than compensation requires a different explanation.  A possible 
one is that the law clearly stipulates that violations of conflict of interest provision result 
in liability vis-à-vis the corporation, not the shareholders, and Russian law does not 
provide for derivative action. Thus, it is unclear whether shareholders would indeed have 
standing if they sued for damages (Black, Kraakman, and Tarassova 1998).  
Several decisions addressed the issue whether an interested person was in fact a party 
to a transaction, or a representative of that party. Thus, the decisions had to address 
precisely the ambiguities left in the law. It was disputed, for example, whether a director 
who bought shares of “his” company had “an interest” when he was buying the shares 
from an underwriter rather than directly from the company. The court rejected the 
argument on the grounds that the underwriter acted on behalf of the company rather than 
as an independent agent and voided the contract.30  
In another case31, Informenergo and Gala-Inform entered into a contract over parts of 
a building, the value of which exceeded two percent of Informenergo’s assets. Thus, 
approval by the Shareholder Meeting was required.32 The general director of 
Informenergo had an interest in the transaction by virtue of the fact that he - together with 
other affiliates - held over twenty percent of the stock in Gala-Inform.33 The lower court 
denied the action brought by Informenergo to void the contract. It held that because the 
general director had authorized a third person to sign the contract on behalf of 
                                                                                                                                                 
interest). Information Letter of 13 march 2001 No. 62 published in Vestnik Vyshevo Arbitrazhnogo Suda 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii No. 7 (2001), pp. 72, 79 (hereinafter Information Letter No. 62). 
30 Information Letter op. cit at p. 79.  
31 Presidium Supreme Arbitrazh Court, 27 July 2000 (No. 8342/99). 
32 See Art. 83 JSCL. 
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Informenergo, the director himself was neither a party nor acted as a representative, and 
thus a conflict of interest situation did not exist. The SAC reversed, explaining that the 
delegation of the power to sign the contract on behalf of the company did not eliminate 
the conflict of interest situation.  
Other cases addressed the question, whether a conflict of interest provisions could 
affect a transaction concluded after the conflict of interest situation had been eliminated 
or before it came about. In one case, the plaintiff, a close corporation, had acquired shares 
in a joint stock company. The general director of the joint stock company was a 
cofounder of the plaintiff, holding 20% of its stock. He sold that stake prior to the 
transaction in question. The court ruled that because the conflict of interest situation must 
exist at the time the transaction is concluded, there was no violation. The SAC explicitly 
stated that “by virtue of Article 81 of the Law on Joint Stock Companies,, an interest in 
the transaction has to be ascertained at the time it is entered into.”34 
In a separate case, a joint stock company concluded a contract to acquire goods from 
another corporation. The value of the transaction exceeded two percent of the 
corporation’s assets. Within a month after entering into the agreement, the plaintiff’s 
general director acquired a stake of 20 percent in the seller’s company. The court held 
that in these circumstances approval by the shareholder meeting was not necessary. The 
transaction was within the realm of ordinary business transactions and the conflict of 
interest situation arose only after the transaction had already been concluded.  
                                                                                                                                                 
33 The general director held 40% in AOZT Flesch-Invest, which in turn held 50% in OOO Flesch and 50% 
in Flesch-Market. Flesch Market held 50% in OOO Tovarischestvo Flesch, which is the sole founder of 
Gala-Inform.  
34 Information Letter op. cit at p. 80. 
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Existing case law reveals that courts are still struggling with recognizing conflict of 
interest situations as such or denying legal remedies where there is no clear conflict of 
interest. Take, for example, the following case, in which a company demanded from its 
bank to carry out a transaction in foreign currencies. The bank refused to follow the order 
on the grounds that it violated conflict of interest provisions, because the bank customer 
was also a major shareholder in the bank. A lower court in fact invalidated the decision, 
but was reversed by the SAC. The latter argued that the transaction was in compliance 
with banking and currency regulations and that the bank had no right to refuse to execute 
the order. The ownership relations were regarded as immaterial for this decision.35 
In part, Russian case law can be blamed for deficient legislation. In fact, 
commentators have pointed out even before case law emerged that the law would give 
rise to ambiguities (Black, Kraakman, and Tarassova 1998). But this is only part of the 
story. Even the best designed law cannot stipulate all future contingencies 
unambiguously, and legislating actions that by their vary nature are hard to capture in 
clear cut statutory provisions will inevitably result in incomplete law. 
 
3. Germany 
German corporate law is highly detailed and most provisions in the law are 
mandatory, meaning that they cannot be changed by shareholder agreement. Case law is 
very limited, mostly because of the high threshold the law establishes for shareholder 
suits and the denial of derivative action. The one procedural remedy the law does allow, 
the challenging of the validity of decisions taken at the shareholder meeting in court, has 
been used quite extensively, and in the eyes of many observers, even excessively.  
                                                 
35 Information Letter No. 62 at p. 82.  
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The high level of specificity of the law and the absence of procedural rules to bring 
cases can be interpreted within our framework was a Type II incomplete law. Rather than 
allocating residual lawmaking rights to deal with future contingencies, the law seeks to 
precisely regulate those issues it anticipated at the time the law was drafted or amended. 
Inevitably, the result was incomplete law (Type II). Given the absence of procedural 
rules, which precluded courts from taking up a more active role as residual lawmakers, 
this resulted in serious under-enforcement.  
The corporate law subjects management to the standards of a diligent entrepreneur.36 
Several provisions further prohibit members of the board from competing directly or 
indirectly with the corporation,37 and subject credit contracts between them and the 
corporation to the approval of the supervisory board.38 These provisions have been 
interpreted as statutory specifications of the general duty of loyalty (Hopt and 
Wiedemann 1992; Hueffer 1995). In theory, this provision could have served as a focal 
point for courts to develop principles of corporate conduct similar to the case law that 
evolved in common law jurisdictions under fiduciary duties. Given the lack of procedural 
support, however, a body of case law never developed, even after courts extended 
procedural support by way of case law.39  
Still, in several cases, courts have developed basic principles concerning the duty of 
loyalty for managers and have extended these principles first to blockholders and 
subsequently to minority shareholders. At first courts were reluctant to accept the notion 
that in a corporation directors owed fiduciary duties to shareholders. Such duties were 
                                                 
36 § 93 Aktienggesetz (AktG). 
37 § 88 AktG. 
38 § 89 AktG. 
39 Holzmueller Decision. BGHZ 83, 122. 
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recognized only in highly personal relations, such as partnerships or employee 
relationships, where the additional feature of dependence led to the recognition of a duty 
of loyalty (Treuepflicht) already in the nineteenth century (Wellenhofer-Klein 2000). 
Only in 1975 did the German Supreme Court (BGH) recognize such a duty for closed 
corporation,40 and extended the application to joint stock companies in 1988.41  
In the relevant case, Linotype, a minority shareholder challenged a decision to 
liquidate the company taken at the shareholder meeting with the votes of the only 
majority shareholder. The undisputed purpose of this decision was that the majority 
shareholder wished to integrate some operations of the company into his own company, 
but could not achieve this by way of merger, because under the law this required the 
consent of all shareholders.42 Prior to the shareholder meeting, the majority shareholder 
had already convened with the management board and discussed the details of the 
transaction, including the value of the assets that were to be transferred. The court held 
that the majority shareholder violated his duty of loyalty vis-à-vis the minority 
shareholders by discussing these issues without giving the minority shareholders a chance 
to participate or to take actions to acquire the company or its assets.43 
At the core of the recognition of the duty of loyalty for corporations was the notion 
that directors and possibly other stakeholders may be in a position to exercise substantial 
control, the corollary of which is the duty of loyalty. By 1995, this duty was extended to 
minority shareholders who had a veto right over a decision that determined the very 
                                                 
40 ITT-Decision, BGHZ 65, 15 (1975). 
41 Linotype decision, BGHZ 103, 184 (1988) 
42 Note that the transfer of assets has been a common strategy to circumvent the overtly rigid requirements 
of unanimous decisions for approving a merger. § 65 Umwandlungsgesetz (Transformation Law) passed in 
1995 requires a qualified majority of ¾. Corporate statutes may stipulate higher majority requirements.  
43 The court actually referred the matter back to the court of appeal for further investigation on this point.  
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existence of the corporation. In the Girmes case, the court ruled that the exercise of veto 
power by minority shareholders at a shareholder meeting, which blocked a decision that 
might have saved the company from liquidation, constituted a breach of their fiduciary 
duty vis-à-vis other shareholders. 44 When the Girmes corporation became insolvent, a 
shareholder meeting was convened to decide on a decrease in corporate capital with a 
ratio of 5:2. The editor of a shareholder rights journal obtained proxies from minority 
shareholders to block this decision, arguing that a ratio of 5:3 would still safe the 
company without diluting minority shareholders as much. Because an agreement could 
not be reached, the refinancing arrangement failed and the company soon entered into 
bankruptcy proceedings. Shareholders voting with the majority took the matter to court. 
They sought damages for the loss of their stakes in the corporation, arguing that if the 
change in corporate capital had been implemented, the company would not have been 
bankrupted.45 The court held in favor of the majority shareholders. Because shareholders 
owe each other fiduciary duties, they are not entitled to block decision for selfish 
motives, especially when the very existence of the corporation is at stake. The court 
accepted the majority shareholders’ view that creditors would not have accepted any 
other outcome of the shareholder meeting than the one they supported.46  
An important implication of these cases is not only that courts used the principle of 
the duty of loyalty to limit the powers of directors or other stakeholders (Wellenhofer-
Klein 2000), but that they employed a broad legal principle (Type I incomplete law) to 
                                                 
44 Girmes Decision, BGHZ 129, 136 (1995).  
45 The lawsuit was actually filed against the editor that voted the proxies, because he refused to disclose the 
identity of shareholders that had given him the proxy. The court ruled in favor of the majority shareholders. 
Although the corporate fiduciary duties did not directly apply to the editor, who was not a shareholder, but 
held him liable under agency law for his refusal to disclose the principals he was representing. 
46 The decision has been widely accepted among legal scholars. See (Timm 1991) and (Dreher 1993). 
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correct for a rigid statutory law. In Linotype, the duty of loyalty was used to assess 
strategies that were designed to circumvent a unanimous vote on the winding up of the 
corporation. In Girmes, it was applied to mitigate the powers that flowed from the 
supermajority requirements for changes in corporate capital imposed by the law.  The 
irony is that while the concept of fiduciary duty has been used in the U.S. as the ultimate 
bastion of shareholders rights against the backdrop of a highly permissive corporate law, 
in civil law countries, such as Germany, it is used to balance a highly rigid mandatory 
law. The lesson seems to be that statutory law is inept to regulate in much detail the 
complex relation among key stakeholders in the corporation, which require a careful 
balancing act that is best left with the courts (Hüffer 1990).   
 Our analysis of the German case law is consistent with a study by Johnson et al. 
(2000) who examine how courts in French civil law countries have dealt with cases in 
which corporate insiders used their position to transfer corporate assets either directly to 
themselves or to another company they control (tunneling). They point out that clear, 
rigid statutory rules may invite strategies that conform to the letter of the law, but dilute 
corporate assets in their own favor. By contrast, the notion of fairness embedded in 
fiduciary duty allows courts in common law countries to assess the entire transaction. As 
the authors note, 
“precisely because the common law notion of fiduciary duty is associated with a 
high level of judicial discretion to assess the terms of transactions and to make 
rules, it is at odds with the civil law emphasis on legal certainty.”. 
  
Using our framework of the incompleteness of law, we make a similar point arguing that 
when it is not possible to identify ex ante the type of actions that will amount to a 
violation of the law (i.e. and action that would be considered a self-dealing transaction), 
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residual lawmaking rights should be allocated to courts, not left with legislatures. This 
does give courts substantial discretion. In fact, German legal scholars have raised the 
concern that courts might misuse the duty of loyalty by using their own judgment to 
assess the fairness of private transactions, rather than respecting the autonomous rights of 
private parties to decide this for themselves.47 This argument is flawed for several 
reasons. Mandatory statutory law does not better honor the private autonomy of corporate 
stakeholders. Moreover, bringing a case to court suggests that private parties were unable 
to agree on the meaning of the obligations they owe each other. The solution is not 
necessarily a court as a third party arbiter, but failing to provide dispute resolution 
mechanisms leaves conflicts to be resolved outside the law. Finally, the case law 
discussed suggests that courts used broad principles less to substitute the goals of the 
parties with their own than to correct for statutory law that left little autonomy to private 
parties.  
  
                                                 
47 As Wellenhofer-Klein [2000 #1399] put it, “upholding one party to the duty of loyalty always implies an 
interference with the private autonomy of that person” (at p. 588) 
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Part IV: Transplanting Fiduciary Duty 
 
The incompleteness of law has important implications for transplanting law from one 
system to another. Given that neither statutory nor case law will specify all relevant 
contingencies, the effectiveness of transplanted law depends on how the law will be 
understood, interpreted and ultimately applied by domestic institutions in the transplant 
country (Berkowitz, Pistor, and Richard 2002). In addition, the allocation of lawmaking 
and law enforcement rights to the proper agents – courts vs. regulators - becomes critical 
for the effectiveness of law, implying that the process of legal transplantation should be 
supported by institutional design and institutional reform. Obviously, this is a much more 
complex process than simply transplanting law. Legal institutions, such as the courts in 
Delaware, are the product of a long evolutionary process, and so is the law they produce 
along the way. As we have seen, other states in the United States have found it difficult to 
emulate this model. One can hardly expect that other countries with a very different legal 
history will do any better. If law was complete, the task would me much easier. Law 
would give clear guidance to social and economic actors as well as to law enforcers and 
thus should deter in transplant countries as effectively as in origin countries. The 
incompleteness of law is therefore an important element that can explain the transplant 
effect. Empirical evidence has shown that legal transplants are often rejected or ignored 
in the law receiving countries and thus have little direct impact on either court practice or 
behavior (Berkowitz, Pistor, and Richard 2002). The same pattern appears to countries 
irrespective of the origin of their legal systems, i.e. whether they belong to the common 
law, or one of the civil law families.  
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Our theory would predict that the more incomplete the law is, the less effective the 
transplantation will be. The transplantation of open-ended concepts, such as fiduciary 
duty, therefore seems particularly difficult, because it cannot serve as a clear guidance for 
actual behavior or as an effective deterrent against violations. A response to this problem 
has been to favor  “bright-line” rules over broad legal concepts in legal reform projects 
(Hay, Shleifer, and Vishny 1996)?  Indeed, this insight is reflected in the Russian 
corporate law, which was drafted with the help of American legal experts who 
emphasized the educational function of corporate law and the importance of spelling out 
in much detail the procedural rights of shareholders in the corporate enterprise (Black and 
Kraakman 1996; Black, Kraakman, and Hay 1996). However, bright-line rules do not 
eliminate the incompleteness problem. While they do not pose the same problems of 
Type I incomplete law, such as fiduciary duty, they create the typical problems of Type II 
incomplete law. Bright line rules are relatively easy to draft, but are likely to over-deter 
since many actions are flatly prohibited may potentially be welfare enhancing. Another 
caveat is that they may be easily circumvented, implying that they may under-deter as 
well. This applies especially to highly specific rules that attempt to differentiate types of 
actions that shall be prohibited from those that are permissible. Moreover, bright line 
rules may limit the role courts play in applying and interpreting the law, in fact they are 
designed to limit the courts’ power. This may be sensible in areas of the law where other 
institutions, such as regulators, could effectively enforce the law. Otherwise, a better 
solution might be to explicitly allocate lawmaking and law enforcement rights to courts 
and to encourage a process that could eventually lead to better, i.e. more complete, case 
law.  
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To understand the above point better, recall the failure of civil law systems to allocate 
residual lawmaking rights to courts in the area of fiduciary duty. Whenever the law does 
not either explicitly or implicitly allocate residual lawmaking rights, individuals are the 
default holders of such rights. When disputes arise and different parties hold different 
views about the interpretation of their rights, the logical consequence of this allocation of 
lawmaking rights is dispute resolution outside the formal legal framework. While this 
outcome may be satisfactory in cases where one may count on the cooperation of the 
parties concerned, absent incentives to cooperate, the most likely outcome is that the 
party with greater de facto power prevails. In the corporate context of transition 
economies, this could be management, or controlling shareholders.  
Giving courts residual lawmaking rights implies taking the risk that courts will arrive 
at solutions that may not be desirable from either an economic efficiency or social 
welfare standpoint. As noted above, lack of independence and impartiality of courts is an 
important explanation for why some legal systems have opted for restricting the courts’ 
lawmaking rights. But this argument is only partly convincing. Courts are reactive, not 
proactive law enforcers meaning that courts get involved as arbiters only when a dispute 
is brought before them. The most likely response to courts that are corrupt or politicized 
is therefore less litigation, not excessive litigation with courts being instrumentalized for 
ulterior motives. Russian litigation data for commercial disputes in the first half of the 
1990s suggests that this was indeed a wide spread response to a court system, whose 
trustworthiness was in doubt, not the least because of its roots in the socialist system 
(Pistor 1995a; Pistor 1996). In contrast to other transition economies, where litigation 
rates boomed after the onset of radical economic reforms, litigation rates in Russia 
 39
declined by 30 percent annually in 1993 and 1994. Since 1995 the trend has been slowly 
reserved. By 2000, litigation rates had nearly doubled,48 suggesting a greater demand for 
the services courts may provide, the remaining problems of the Russian court system, 
including lack of regular payments of judges, inabilities to fill vacant posts, and 
allegations of corruption not withstanding (Murphy 1998).49  
The reactive nature of court actions limits the scope for misuse, but does not rule out 
the possibility that courts may be used by some parties strategically. Some of the Russian 
case law discussed above could be interpreted as a strategic use of courts by companies 
wishing to escape contractual liability. Courts may be more volatile to such pressures 
when dealing with open-ended standards than when dealing with clearly specified rules.50 
But this danger has to be weighed against the potential benefits of making a broader 
range of actions justiciable. The question that must be addressed is, if courts shall not do 
it, who will exercise the right to delineate the powers of corporate actors? A possible 
alternative to courts as holders of residual lawmaking and law enforcement rights are 
regulators. However, as we pointed out in Section 1 of this paper, regulators are not able 
to enforce the principle of fiduciary duty at reasonable cost. In fact, allocating residual 
lawmaking and law enforcement rights to them might lead to excessive state intervention. 
Litigation has other benefits that both legislation and regulation are missing. As 
Hayek has pointed out, an important function of litigation is that weaknesses in existing 
law are revealed, which may be corrected by the legislature (Hayek 1973). While it may 
                                                 
48 In 1992, the total number of disputes was around 380,000 cases. In 200,000 a total of 643,353 cases had 
been filed and 539,490 rulings were issued. See Court-statistics published by the SAC in Vestnik Vyshevo 
Arbitrazhnovo Suda 2001 #4, pp. 12. 
49 Murphy’s analysis applies to the courts of general jurisdiction. For a more positive assessment of the 
Russian Arbitrazh courts with jurisdiction over commercial affairs, see (Hendley 1999)  and(Hendley 
2001). 
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possible for legislatures to collect information by other means, such as surveys (Kaplow 
1997), the necessary signals to conduct a survey may not be received until much harm 
has been done. There is some indirect evidence for the role case law plays in the 
advancement of corporate law. During the decades that followed the first enactment of 
corporate statutes in England, the US, France and Germany, legislative change has been 
much more frequent in common law countries than in civil law countries (Pistor et al. 
2001). This suggests that case law holds important information for legislature and 
triggers quicker intervention than the regular legislative process. 
If there is no good alternative to courts in handling actions that may violate fiduciary 
duties, then the question arises, if and how courts in civil law countries could be induced 
to play a more active role in enforcing fiduciary principles. Just changing statutory law 
may not do the trick. In addition, procedural rules have to be adapted so that minority 
shareholders have standing in court and can litigate at reasonable cost. Take the example 
of recent legal changes in Japan, a country that is usually classified as a German civil law 
system, but that received U.S. style corporate law in 1950. Despite the infusion of Anglo-
American law, courts continued to play only a minor role in enforcing shareholder rights. 
While this has often been attributed to cultural factors, changes in procedural rules 
governing litigation costs resulted in a flood of derivative suits. Thus, it appears that 
institutional obstacles rather than culture prevented litigation prior to these changes (West 
2001).51 
                                                                                                                                                 
50 In this sense, the narrow wording of the conflict of interest rules might be regarded as a effective limits 
and discretionary court power.  
51 Whether or not derivative actions actually result in better case law on fiduciary duty, or even more 
broadly, leads to improvements in corporate governance, is quite a different matter. See [West, 2001 
#1382] and (Romano 1991) for a critical account of the economic rational for litigation. 
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Still, our survey of the emerging case law in transition economies suggests that 
procedural rules may not be sufficient. As long as first instance courts continue to stick to 
the letter of the law, they may discourage litigation. Thus, the law should explicitly 
allocate residual lawmaking rights to them. Open ended, broad standards, such as 
fiduciary duty, or “diligent trader” will not suffice to motivate private agents to bring a 
case, or to induce courts to use a case for residual lawmaking. Instead, the law could 
enumerate typical actions that might be considered as a violation of fiduciary duty 
principles, but add explicitly that other, similar actions, should be treated by courts in the 
same manner. Courts would have to develop case law that distinguishes actions that fit 
within this category from those that don’t. The scope of the residual lawmaking rights 
would be much more focused, enabling disgruntled parties to pin point misjudgment in 
appeal processes.  
 None of the above suggests that courts in civil law countries will produce the 
same solutions as common law judges in the U.K. or the U.S. In fact, allocating 
lawmaking rights to courts is likely result in greater divergence rather than convergence 
of the law, as judges will respond to cases brought before them, which are bound to differ 
from cases litigated elsewhere.  
 
V. Conclusion 
 
 The major proposition of this paper is that courts should hold residual lawmaking 
rights with regards to actions that may violate the principle of fiduciary duty. The 
principle of fiduciary duty exemplifies Type I incomplete law. It is broad and 
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ambiguously stated. The very nature of the actions that are governed by this principle 
make it impossible to right a highly specific law. Where lawmakers have attempted to do 
so, they have usually carved out only a subset of conflict of interest provisions, but have 
not been able to replicate the reach of the fiduciary duty principle as enforced by courts. 
Regulators may be superior to courts in enforcing financial market regulation, given that 
it is easier to standardize the type of action the law seeks to prevent, but they are hardly a 
solution to the problem of enforcing broad principles of corporate conduct. Courts as 
residual lawmakers benefit from their function as reactive law enforcers. They are called 
upon to make law when critical information is revealed in the process of litigation and 
therefore have the specific facts at hand when issuing their ruling.  
We do not claim that courts can produce complete law. Courts, just as legislatures 
or regulators, cannot foresee all future contingencies. But they can solve a case brought to 
the attention to the court, even when statutory and past case law is incomplete. Their 
function is to adapt the law in light of specific cases and thus enhance its completeness, 
and ultimately its deterrence effect. Greater certainty about the residual lawmaking 
function of courts is likely to increase litigation (all else being equal), which will result in 
a more comprehensive – and thus more complete - body of case law.  
In transition economies, courts may not yet be in a position to play an effective 
role in developing norms for corporate conduct. The scarcity of cases that have made it to 
the courts so far can be taken as an indicator that there is little demand for their actions. 
However, the lack of litigation in this area may well lie in the uncertainty about the 
courts’ residual lawmaking rights and the lack of clear procedural rules to support 
litigation. Remarkably, Russia has seen probably the largest number of cases among 
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transition economies on conflict of interest problems. Perhaps it has also experienced the 
most extensive violation of shareholder rights. An alternative explanation is that by 
explicitly regulating conflict of interest matters in statutory law and referring the solution 
of these matters to courts, the legislature confirmed that these issues were justiciable. The 
main function of these provisions was thus to encourage litigation by allocating residual 
lawmaking rights to courts. This does not mean that the law was optimal, i.e. that it has 
solved all relevant issues. But the fact that private parties have responded to an explicit 
allocation of residual lawmaking rights is encouraging. At the same time, it is worth 
noting that where the scope of the courts’ residual lawmaking rights was too broad, 
litigation has not occurred.  
When called to duty, lower level Russian courts have shown to be reluctant to 
seize the opportunity and develop into more active residual lawmakers. Still, the SAC has 
indicated that it is not satisfied with highly literal interpretations and has already begun to 
guide lower level courts not to take an overtly literal interpretation of the law. To be sure, 
the decisions of the SAC have not all been consistent or entirely convincing. However, 
we would argue that this is part of the process of residual lawmaking. In fact, closer 
inspection of early English case law exemplifies the process of trial and error it takes to 
establish a consistent body of case law over time.  
In sum, the Anglo-American concept of fiduciary duty may not be easy 
transplantable either to civil law systems or to transition economies. However, an 
important insight that may be gained from the history of this concept in Anglo-American 
law is that a broad concept combined with allocating residual lawmaking rights to courts 
may be the most effective way to deal with issues that escape close legal regulation. 
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When given explicit residual lawmaking rights, courts in civil law jurisdictions might 
well develop a body of case law that will be of some guidance in the future. Not 
allocating courts residual lawmaking rights to courts may be counter productive, as this 
will relief courts from the responsibility of developing a body of case law, without a 
better alternative for making law in this area at hand.  
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